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Administrative agencies have grown collectively into what some
view as an administrative state that is the functional equivalent of a
fourth branch of government.1 That view provides a useful vantage
point from which to examine separation of powers problems that
occur in the administrative state.
* This article is an adaptation of an article first published in 82 FLA. B. J. 92
(2008). Daniel Manry has been an administrative law judge for the State of Florida
since 1989. Judge Manry received his B.S. in 1968 from the University of Florida
College of Journalism, his J.D. in 1971 from the University of Florida College of
Law, and a Master of Laws in Taxation in 1983 from Georgetown University. He
is a former assistant attorney general in the tax section of the Florida Department of
Legal Affairs; a bureau chief for the Florida Department of Revenue; an associate
in the law firm of Holland & Knight; and a Reginald Heber Smith Community
Lawyer. He has also served as a legal editor for the Tax Management Portfolios in
both the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) and the editing law firm of Silverstein
and Mullins. Judge Manry is licensed in Florida, Colorado, and the District of
Columbia. The author expresses sincere thanks to several peers who reviewed
drafts of this article: Robert S. Cohen, Chief Judge, Division of Administrative
Hearings; Ralph DeMeo, a partner in the law firm of Hopping Green & Sams; Scott
Boyd, Executive Director and General Counsel, The Florida Legislature Joint
Administrative Procedure Committee; Larry and Cathy Sellers, partners in the law
firms of Holland & Knight and Broad and Cassell, respectively; and Judge John G.
Van Laningham, a stablemate of the author at the Division. The views expressed in
this article are the author's and not necessarily the views of his peers.
1. Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has
Indirectly Effected a Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REv. 689, 700
(2006) (citing Jonathan Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California's
Separation of Powers, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1079, 1139 (2004)).
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Separation of powers problems occur in the administrative state
in two stages. 2 First-stage problems occur when Congress or a state
legislature delegates legislative authority to an administrative agency
of the executive branch, and the delegated legislative authority lacks
adequate standards to guide agency action required to implement the
enabling statute. 3 Second-stage problems occur when agency action,
undertaken through either rulemaking or adjudication of individual
cases, arrogates legislative power by enlarging or modifying
adequate standards that Congress or the legislature provides in the
terms of the enabling statute.
Second-stage problems may present a greater threat to separation
of powers protections because second-stage problems are more subtle
and less likely to be challenged by a party in an administrative
proceeding, especially a pro se party. ' State courts have been
vigilant of first-stage problems but do not typically see second-stage
problems as a separation of powers issue.
This article examines second-stage agency action in the
administrative state as a separation of powers issue. The article
concludes that the separation of powers doctrine requires the exercise
of second-stage power in the administrative state to be coextensive
with first-stage powers delegated by the legislature in the terms of the
enabling statute. The article compares approaches to second-stage
problems in the federal and Florida administrative states and suggests
approaches to three second-stage problems in Florida that may be
useful in other administrative states. The article sees the separation
of powers doctrine as a self-executing structural aspect of
government which defines the role of an AU 6 as a veto point that
properly checks the arrogation of legislative power during second-
stage agency action.
2. Id. at 707-08.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 695, 707-08.
5. Id. at 695.
6. The term "AL" includes hearing officers and administrative law judges
because the distinction is titular rather than substantive.
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II. SIGNIFICANCE AND STRUCTURE
The separation of powers doctrine is as fundamental to federal
and state government as the right to vote and the right to a
representative government.7 The doctrine is a structural aspect of
government that parcels power among the three branches, provides a
system of checks and balances intended to minimize governmental
power, increases the functional veto points in government, and
fosters a more deliberative government.
8
The separation of powers doctrine is sometimes compared to
federalism. 9 Federalism is a vertical division of power between
federal and state government.1 ° The separation of powers doctrine is
a horizontal division of power within separate federal and state
governments. 
11
The federal constitution contains no express separation of powers
clause. The federal separation of powers is a doctrine that arises
from the structure of the United States Constitution which creates
three branches of government and vests separate powers in each
branch.12  In Florida, the separation of powers is an express act in
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution of the State of Florida.1 3 The
act provides: 14 "The powers of the state government shall be divided
into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person
belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to
either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein."' 
5
7. Garry, supra note 1, at 694.
8. Id. at 690-92, 695.
9. Id. at 691.
10. Id.
II. Id. at 691-92.
12. Id. at 690.
13. FLA. Const. art. II, § 3.
14. For convenience, rather than precision, this article uses the terms
"doctrine" and "act" interchangeably to describe federal and state separation of
powers protections.
15. FLA. Const. art. II, § 3. Delaware is similar to the federal model of no
express separation of powers clause. See. DEL. Const. art. II - IV. New Jersey,
like Florida, has an express separation of powers clause. N.J. Const. art. III para. 1.
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No express non-delegation clause exists in either the federal or
Florida constitutions. The non-delegation doctrine in Florida is a
judicial interpretation of the second sentence in the act.
The [separation of powers] doctrine encompasses two
fundamental prohibitions. The first is that no branch
may encroach upon the powers of another. The
second is that no branch may delegate to another
branch its constitutionally assigned power. . . This
Court has repeatedly held that, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the legislature may not delegate
the power to enact laws or to declare what the law
shall be to any other branch. 16
The people surrendered to the legislative branch of government
the power to create legislation but did not surrender the power to
create legislators in the administrative state through broad grants of
legislative power.' 7 The people reserved to themselves the power to
create legislators.18 The separation of powers doctrine, in relevant
part, checks second-stage agency exercise of legislative power by
requiring an agency to administer legislative programs, through
rulemaking or adjudication, pursuant to standards and guidelines that
are ascertainable by reference to terms in the statute implemented. 19
When an agency takes action that goes beyond standards and
guidelines legislatively prescribed in the enabling statute, the agency
becomes a law giver rather than an administrator of the law.2 0
III. SECOND-STAGE LIFE IN THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
16. Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1991)
(citations omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 193 (Thomas
I. Cook ed., Hafner Publ'g Co. 1947)).
19. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 925 (Fla. 1978); FLA.
STAT. § 120.52(8) (2007).
20. Cf Askew, 372 So. 2d at 919 (inadequate first-stage standards make
agency a law giver).
28-2
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The federal administrative state traces its roots to the period of
the Progressive Movement before World War 1.2 The administrative
state sprouted from the push toward a strong central government
during the Great Depression and blossomed in the 1960s and
1970s. 22 Strong government was not considered to be a threat to
liberty but a means of effective action to help people during and after
the New Deal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. 23 Administrative
agencies were to be the agents of effective government action
because experts in an administrative agency presumably would be
insulated from political corruption and would better serve the
people.
24
The federal administrative state has flourished, in relevant part,
through a de facto complicity between the Legislative and Judicial
Branches of government2 5  Congress has willingly transferred to
agencies the task of legislating complex policies which require
politically difficult decisions. 26 Broad grants of legislative authority
leave operative details to the agency and enable elected members of
the legislative branch to simultaneously claim credit and escape
blame for agency action implementing the legislation.2 7
The non-delegation doctrine has not impeded broad grants of
legislative power to the federal administrative state. 28 Federal courts
have not invalidated a statute based on the non-delegation doctrine in
more than seventy years. 29 The absence of a viable non-delegation
doctrine effectively eliminates first-stage separation of powers issues
when Congress delegates power to an administrative agency. Broad
delegations of power also propagate vague or ambiguous legislative
standards that make second-stage violations difficult to resolve as a
separation of powers issue.
21. Garry, supra note 1, at 699.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 699-700.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 702.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 703.
28. Id. at 702.
29. Id.
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Rather than resuscitate the non-delegation doctrine, federal courts
have tolerated broad delegations of legislative power to the
administrative state when accompanied by procedural safeguards. 30
Courts have chosen to exercise more judicial oversight of agency
action during rulemaking or adjudication. The Hard-Look Doctrine,
for example, requires an agency to provide a reasoned analysis that
will enable a reviewing court to conduct a hard-look review of
agency action. 31 Courts have become immersed in the technical
details of agency action through more oversight in the formulation of
agency rules and the application of agency rules to agency
adjudication; determinations of whether agency rules are legislative
or interpretative; and the determination of whether agency action is
entitled to judicial deference. 32  In addition, federal courts have
become more involved in determining when an agency can use
rulemaking or adjudication to implement delegated legislative
authority.
33
Broad delegations of legislative power to the administrative state,
coupled with increased judicial oversight, facilitates more judicial
control over legislative power exercised in the administrative state
than the judiciary could ever impose on legislative power exercised
in Congress. Some legal scholars associate the demise of the non-
delegation doctrine with increased judicial power and decreased
congressional power. 34
IV. RULEMAKING IN FLORIDA
The separation of powers doctrine is alive and well in Florida, at
least insofar as the doctrine applies to second-stage agency action in
the form of rulemaking. The relationship of the doctrine to second-
stage agency action in the form of adjudication of individual cases is
discussed later in this article.
The separation of powers doctrine did not evolve to its current
vitality in rulemaking without a struggle between the legislative and
30. Id. at 709.
31. Id. at 710-15.
32. Id. at 710-12.
33. Id. at 710-15.
34. Id. at 709.
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judicial branches of government. The struggle included two judicial
doctrines and the legislative responses to each. The judicial doctrines
are discussed as judicial functionalism and the judicial "prove-up"
exception to rulemaking.
A. Judicial Functionalism
Differences in legislative and judicial interpretations of the non-
delegation doctrine in Florida parallel two schools of thought
described as formalism and functionalism. Formalism insists on
clear distinctions between the separate powers of government and
does not recognize the existence of an entity beyond the three
branches. 35  Functionalism values a working government over
adherence to strict divisions between branches of government and
insists that strict separation of powers would impede government
efficiency. 36
Early Florida cases expressly rejected attempts to import
functionalism from the federal administrative state.
Appellants urge . . . that the modem trend in
administrative law is to relax the doctrine of unlawful
delegation of legislative power in favor of an analysis
which focuses upon the existence of procedural
safeguards in the administrative [state] ....
Although the Davis view is an entirely reasonable
one as demonstrated by its adoption in the federal
courts and a minority of state jurisdictions,
nonetheless, it clearly has not been the view in
Florida. ... Regardless of the criticism of the courts'
application of the [non-delegation] doctrine, we
nevertheless conclude that it represents a recognition
35. Id. at 704.
36. Id. at 708; Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal)
Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REv. 357, 362-73 (2000).
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of the express limitation contained in the second
sentence of Article II, Section 3 of our Constitution.37
Judicial repudiation of functionalism was largely limited to first-
stage separation of powers problems. Courts utilized the
functionalism standard to deal with second-stage problems, but the
legislature expressly rejected the functionalism standard for
rulemaking.
The legislature regulates agency action in Florida through
Chapter 120, the Administrative Procedure Act (the APA). 8 Prior
to 1996, Subsection 120.52(8) defined an invalid exercise of
delegated legislative authority more broadly than it does today. 3
Florida courts construed the statutory definition to mean that a rule
was valid if the rule was reasonably related to the enabling statute
and was not arbitrary or capricious. 40 The legislature responded in
1996 by replacing the judicial test with a legislative standard. 41 The
legislative standard added additional requirements which stated:
A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not
sufficient to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific
law to be implemented is also required. An agency
may adopt only rules that implement, interpret, or
make specific the particular powers and duties
37. Askew, 372 So. 2d at 918, 924 (citing K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF
THE SEVENTIES, § 2.04, at 30 (1976)).
38. FLA. STAT. § 120 (2007). References to chapters, sections, and subsections
are to Florida Statutes (2007) unless otherwise stated.
39. A rule was an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority" if the
rule: materially failed to follow statutory rulemaking procedures; exceeded the
grant of rulemaking authority; enlarged, modified, or contravened the specific
provisions of the law implemented; was vague, failed to establish adequate
standards for agency decisions, or vested unbridled discretion in the agency; or was
arbitrary and capricious. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (2005).
40. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Consol.-Tomoka Land Co., 717 So.
2d 72, 78-79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
41. See id. at 77 (because rulemaking in Florida is an exclusive legislative
function, courts agree the Legislature has authority to replace a judicially created
test with a legislative standard for determining when a rule is an invalid exercise of
delegated legislative authority, and courts are not required to differentiate between
legislative and interpretative rules).
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granted by the enabling statute. No agency shall have
authority to adopt a rule only because it is reasonably
related to the purpose of the enabling legislation and is
not arbitrary and capricious, nor shall an agency have
the authority to implement statutory provisions setting
forth general legislative intent or policy. Statutory
language granting rulemaking authority or generally
describing the powers and functions of an agency shall
be construed to extend no further than the particular
powers and duties conferred by the same statute.42
In 1998, an appellate court interpreted the reference to "particular
powers and duties" as a "functional test."'43 Under the functional test,
a rule was valid if the rule fell within the range of powers delegated
by the legislature or if the rule regulated a matter directly within the
class of powers and duties identified in the statute implemented.4
The legislature disagreed. In 1999, the legislature rejected the
court's functional test and amended the statutory definition of an
invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority by replacing the
reference to "particular powers and duties" with a requirement that
rules may implement or interpret only specific powers and duties
granted in the enabling statute. 45
The legislative requirement for "specific powers and duties" in
the enabling statute may, or may not, end judicial functionalism in
the administrative state. In 2000, a court interpreted the "specific
powers and duties" standard to require that a reviewing court
determine only whether the enabling statute: "contains a specific
grant of legislative authority for the rule, not whether the grant of
authority is specific enough.",46 The open issue is how unspecific a
legislative grant of authority may be and still provide standards and
guidelines that, by reference to the statute implemented, are adequate
42. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (1996) (amended 1999) (emphasis added).
43. Consol.-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 80.
44. Id.
45. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (1999).
46. Sw. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d
594, 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis omitted).
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to check second-stage agency exercise of legislative power through
rulemaking.47
B. The Prove-up Exception Swallowed the Rule
Under the APA, agency action is generally based on a rule, non-
rule policy, or both.48 The legislature defines a rule in Subsection
120.52(15) as a written or oral statement of general applicability that
implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes
procedural or practice requirements of an agency and does not fall
within an express statutory exception. 49 An agency statement of
policy that does not satisfy the statutory definition of a rule is non-
rule policy. Non-rule policy has been described as incipient agency
policy because it is policy that is still emerging and has not yet
flowered into general applicability.5 °
For many years, the APA did not contain an express requirement
that agencies adopt policy statements of general applicability as rules.
The requirement for rulemaking was a judicial interpretation of the
APA.
The APA does not in terms require agencies to make
rules of their policy statements of general
applicability, nor does it explicitly invalidate action
taken to effectuate policy statements of that character
which have not been legitimated by the rulemaking
process. But that is the necessary effect of the APA if
the prescribed rulemaking procedures are not to be
atrophied by nonuse.5 1
Early court decisions required an agency to explicate, or prove-
up, non-rule policy each time the agency adjudicated an individual
47. Askew, 372 So. 2d at 925; accord Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 266.
48. McDonald v. Dep't of Banking and Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 582 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977).
49. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(15); See Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles
v. Schluter, 705 So. 2d 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (agency statement need not be
reduced to writing to satisfy the definition of a rule).
50. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 581.
51. Id. at 580.
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case, but courts did not impose the same requirement for agency
policy that had been adopted as a rule. 52 Rulemaking was held to
displace proof and debate of policy in an administrative hearing.53
Courts reasoned that the burden of repeatedly proving-up non-rule
policy in the adjudication of individual cases would impel agencies to
move from vague standards, to definite standards, to broad principles,
to rules:
The APA does not chill the open development of
policy by forbidding all utterances of it except within
the strict rulemaking process of Section 120.54.
Agencies will hardly be encouraged to structure their
discretion progressively by vague standards, then
definite standards, then broad principles, then rules if
they cannot record and communicate emerging policy
in those forms without offending Section 120.54. The
folly of imposing rulemaking [requirements] on all
statements of incipient policy is evident.
Florida's APA does not have those bizarre effects.
.[R]ulemaking [requirements] are imposed only
on policy statements of general applicability, i.e.,
those statements which are intended by their own
effect to create rights, or to require compliance, or
otherwise to have the direct and consistent effect of
law. That is the meaning of the essentially identical
"rule" definition in the federal Administrative
Procedure Act, which "obviously could be read
literally to encompass virtually any utterance by an
,,54agency....
The judicial requirement for agencies to prove-up non-rule policy
did not impel agencies to rulemaking. Later judicial decisions
52. Id. at 583.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 580-81 (citations omitted).
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expanded the prove-up exception to allow agencies to prove-up
agency policy of general applicability. Courts regarded attempts to
distinguish non-rule policy from a rule to be "academic endeavors"
that had been "largely discarded., 55 The judicial requirement for
rulemaking atrophied into nonuse.
The prove-up exception blurred the legislative distinction
between a rule and non-rule policy, allowed an agency to exercise
discretion in choosing whether to implement delegated legislative
authority through rulemaking or adjudication, and had a chilling
effect on the separation of powers doctrine, because Florida courts
did not typically view second-stage agency action as a separation of
powers problem. The prove-up exception for non-rule policy
eventually "swallowed the rule" 56 and prompted a legislative
response.
The legislative response initially codified the judicial prove-up
exception for unadopted rules in Subsection 120.57(1)(e) but added
requirements similar to those in Subsection 120.52(8) to ensure that
an unadopted rule was not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority. After further review, the legislature amended Subsection
120.57(l)(e), effective January 1, 2009, to limit the use of the prove-
up exception to situations where an agency has not had adequate time
to adopt a rule but is expeditiously engaged in the rulemaking
process. 57
Unlike the federal administrative state, rulemaking is no longer a
matter of agency discretion in Florida. 58 The legislature placed an
affirmative duty on state agencies to codify policy statements which
satisfy the statutory definition of a rule by adopting those policy
statements as rules in accordance with statutorily prescribed
rulemaking procedures and promulgating the adopted rules in the
Florida Administrative Code. 59
55. Barker v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 428 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
56. Patricia Dore, Florida Limits Policy Development Through Administrative
Adjudication and Requires Indexing and Availability of Agency Orders, 19 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 437 (1991) [hereinafter Dore 1].
57. 2008 Fla. Laws. 104.
58. FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (2007).
59. Consol.-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 80.
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V. ADJUDICATION OF INDIVIDUAL CASES IN FLORIDA
In order to understand the role of an ALJ as a veto point that
checks agency arrogation of legislative power during the adjudicatory
process, one must first understand the adjudicatory process. APA
procedures for disputing agency action can be confusing for a
stranger to the act, due in part to distinctions between proposed,
recommended, and final agency action. It helps to keep in mind the
truism that agency action by any name is still agency action in the
administrative state and must comply with the separation of powers
doctrine.
The APA serves several legislative purposes. The APA is a
legislative mechanism for intra-branch dispute resolution within the
administrative state. 60 The APA is also a legislative mechanism for
checking the arrogation of legislative power by the administrative
state. 61 Achievement of both purposes is ensured through
procedures prescribed in the APA, including inter-branch judicial
review. 62
The APA defines the term "agency" to include the twenty-five
state departments defined in non-APA statutes 63  and each
departmental unit; the Governor, in the exercise of executive powers
other than those derived from the constitution; a state officer; a state
board, including the Board of Governors of the State University
System; a state university board of trustees; a commission, including
60. Patricia Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings, 13 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 965, 967, 970, 1017 (1986) [hereinafter Dore 11].
61. FLA. STAT. §120.52(8) (2007); Dore II, supra note 60, at 982, 1017. This
article does not reach the doctrine of administrative deference to an agency's
statutory interpretation. Deference is limited to situations in which the statutory
interpretation is within the substantive expertise of the agency, the evidentiary
record in the administrative hearing supports a finding that an interpretation of
statutory terms requires special agency insight or expertise, the agency articulates
in the record underlying technical reasons for deference to agency expertise, and
the agency's interpretation is not clearly erroneous. Johnston v. Dep't of Prof I
Regulation, 456 So. 2d 939, 943-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). For a discussion of
judicial deference to agency action, see Anuradha Vaitheswaran & Thomas A.
Mayes, The Role of Deference in Judicial Review of Agency Action: A Comparison
of Federal Law, Uniform State Acts, and the Iowa APA, 27 J. NAALJ 402 (2007).
62. FLA. STAT. § 120.65 (2007). See also Dore II, supra note 60, at 965, 967,
970, 1017.
63. FLA. STAT. § 20.02(2) (2007).
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the Commission on Ethics and the Fish and Wildlife Conservation
Commission (a constitutional commission in Florida) when acting
pursuant to statutory authority; a regional planning agency; multi-
county special districts; educational units; and each other unit of
government in the state, including counties and municipalities. 64
When an agency undertakes agency action through adjudication
of an individual case, the agency must notify each person whose
substantial interests are affected by the agency action. 65 The notice
must include a point of entry, which, in relevant part, prescribes a
deadline for a substantially affected person to dispute the agency
action. 66 Agency action is proposed agency action while the point of
entry remains open. 6  If the point of entry closes without a timely
challenge, proposed agency action becomes final agency action. 68 If
a substantially affected party challenges proposed agency action
within the point of entry, the agency action remains proposed during
the adjudicatory process. 69
A substantially affected party challenges proposed agency action
by filing a request for hearing with the agency. The agency refers the
request to a sister agency, the Division of Administrative Hearings
(DOAH), to assign an ALJ to conduct an administrative hearing
pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1) (a 120.57 proceeding) if the
challenge to proposed agency action involves a disputed issue of
material fact and the agency head chooses not to conduct the
hearing.70 If a challenge does not involve a disputed issue of
material fact, all of the parties may agree to refer the dispute to
DOAH. 7
At the conclusion of a 120.57 proceeding, the presiding AU
issues a recommended order, which recommends agency action to
the sibling agency that referred the dispute to DOAH.72 The
64. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1) (2007).
65. FLA. STAT. § 120.569 (2007).
66. Id.
67. See McDonald, 346 So. 2d 569.
68.Id.
69. Id.
70. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1) (2007).
71. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.569, 120.57(1) (2007).
72. Id.
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referring agency issues a final order that is final agency action
subject to an inter-branch judicial review. 73
A 120.57 proceeding may be viewed in some states as a two-tier
proceeding. The first tier culminates in recommended agency action.
Recommended agency action becomes final agency action, in the
second tier, when the referring agency adopts the recommendation in
a final order. If the final order were to modify the recommendation
in accordance with express limits prescribed by the legislature,74 the
modified recommendation would become final agency action subject
to inter-branch judicial review. 75
A challenge to agency rulemaking may be viewed as a single-tier
proceeding. A substantially affected party files a rule challenge with
DOAH rather than the agency engaged in rulemaking. 76  DOAH
assigns an AU to conduct an administrative hearing pursuant to
Section 120.56 (a 120.56 proceeding) to determine the validity of a
proposed, adopted, or unadopted rule.77 The AU issues a final order
that determines whether the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated
legislative authority within the meaning of Subsection 120.52(8).78
The agency engaged in rulemaking must appeal an adverse final
order in an inter-branch judicial review. 79
A substantially affected party may challenge an agency's non-
rule policy in a 120.57 proceeding.80 The party may also challenge
the validity of a rule in a 120.56 proceeding. 81 If agency action is
based on both non-rule policy and rulemaking, a substantially
affected person may challenge each type of policy in separate 120.57
and 120.56 proceedings that are customarily consolidated and heard
in one administrative hearing.8 2
73. Id.
74. FLA. STAT. §120.57(1)0) (2007).
75. FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (2007).
76. FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (2007).
77. Id.
78. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (2007).
79. FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (2007). A proposed rule must be challenged before it
morphs into an adopted rule. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(2)(a) (2007).
80. See FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (2007).
81. See FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (2007).
82. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(4)(f) (2007).
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A. The Unexamined Life of Non-Rule Policy83
One type of second-stage separation of powers problem occurs in
a 120.57 proceeding when proposed agency action is based on non-
rule policy that goes beyond the statute implemented, and a
substantially affected party does not challenge the non-rule policy.
The issue is whether the presiding AU has authority to
independently examine the non-rule policy and, if necessary,
conform the non-rule policy to the statute implemented.
Florida courts suggest that an AU serves the public interest by
independently critiquing an agency's non-rule policy in a 120.57
proceeding. The court decisions are consistent with separation of
powers protections but do not expressly cite the doctrine. 85
The role of an AU in a 120.57 proceeding is not confined to
making findings of fact and conclusions of law:
We are accustomed to think that the principal use
of hearings is to develop records for "adjudicatory" or
"quasi-judicial" decisions. That was the limited role
of administrative hearings in years past, when the
"universe of administrative law was hierarchical, with
the judiciary at its apex." [The] [c]urrent
administrative process ...recognizes that a hearing
independently serves the public interest by providing a
forum to expose, inform and challenge agency policy
86
The ALJ independently plows a sibling agency's policy to
cultivate responsible agency policymaking (RAP). The AU "is also
charged to . . . critique agency policy ... to promote [RAP] .... The
83. "An unexamined life is not worth living." PLATO, THE APOLOGY OF
SOCRATEs 77 (D. F. Nevill trans., F. E. Robinson & Co. 1901).
84. See McDonald, 346 So. 2d 569, State ex rel. Dep't. of Gen. Servs. v.
Willis, 344 So. 2d 580, 591-92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
85. See, e.g., id.
86. State ex rel. Dep't. of Gen. Servs. v. Willis, 344 So. 2d 580, 591-92 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (citations omitted) (cited for different issue in Clemons v.
State Risk Mgmt. Trust Fund, 870 So. 2d 881, 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(Benton, J., concurring)).
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[ALJ] does not merely find the facts and supply the law, as would a
court. The [ALJ] 'independently serves the public interest by
providing a forum to expose, inform and challenge agency policy and
discretion.' 87
RAP is not defined by statute or rule and may vary with the facts
and circumstances in each case. At a minimum, however, RAP
avoids agency action that is susceptible to mandatory remand in an
inter-branch judicial review. 88  Remand is mandatory if agency
action violates a constitutional provision, such as the separation of
powers doctrine, or a statutory provision, such as the statutory
definition of an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. 89
A determination of whether unchallenged non-rule policy
exceeds delegated legislative authority is considered "fair game" for
an AU during a 120.57 proceeding. 90
Thus the APA infuses [a 120.57 proceeding] with
concern for agency policy as well as for facts and law.
The [ALJ] . . . is . . . charged to . . .critique agency
policy as it is revealed in the record .... [T]he [AL's]
duty to respond to the evidence in that way cannot fail
to promote [RAP]. The [AL's] function
encourages an agency to fully and skillfully expound
its nonrule policies by conventional proof methods;
and, in appropriate cases, subjects agency
policymakers to the sobering realization their policies
lack convincing wisdom, and requires them to cope
with the [AL's] adverse commentary.
[n. 12] This type of constraint upon agency action
will not tend to be limited-as is judicial review-to
overseeing the good faith of agency policy choices.
Rather, exposure of the agency's decisional referents
87. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 582-83 (citation omitted).
88. See FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (2007).
89. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(7)(e)(4) (2007).
90. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 583.
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to the critical scrutiny of others possesses a potential
... for improving the degree of objective rationality of
agency decisions.
120.57 proceedings, in which the agency's nonrule
policy is fair game . . . concludes by a final agency
order which explicates "policy within the agency's
exercise of delegated discretion."... 91
The legislative definition of "an invalid exercise of delegated
legislative authority" in Subsection 120.52(8) is not limited to
rulemaking but includes any agency action that goes beyond the
statute implemented. 92 The first two sentences in the statute make
clear that invalid rulemaking is only one form of an invalid exercise
of delegated legislative authority: "Invalid exercise of delegated
legislative authority means action which goes beyond the powers,
functions, and duties delegated by the Legislature. A proposed or
existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority if
... any one of [subparagraphs (a) through (g) apply]. 93 DOAH and
the referring agency are each an agency in the administrative state,
and neither agency may accomplish through non-rule policy and the
adjudication of individual cases that which the separation of powers
doctrine prohibits them from accomplishing through rulemaking. 94
B. Rule Challenges in 120.57 Proceedings
Another second-stage separation of powers problem arises when
disputed agency action in a 120.57 proceeding is based on an invalid
rule, and the substantially affected party challenges the rule in the
120.57 proceeding but does not file a 120.56 rule challenge. The
issue is whether the absence of a 120.56 rule challenge requires an
91. Id. at 582-83 (emphasis added).
92. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (2007)
93. Id.
94. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (2007).
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ALJ to enforce an invalid rule that is challenged in a 120.57
proceeding but not in a duplicative 120.56 proceeding.
The APA, in relevant part, requires a reviewing court to remand a
final order if the agency action is outside delegated legislative
authority or is inconsistent with an agency rule. 95 If an invalid rule is
not challenged in a 120.56 proceeding and must be enforced in a
120.57 proceeding, then the presiding ALJ must recommend agency
action that either enforces the statute and is inconsistent with the rule
or enforces the rule that is at odds with the statute. Final agency
action in either form requires remand. 96
An ALJ can solve the problem without offending either the APA
or the separation of powers doctrine. A substantially affected party
initiates a 120.57 proceeding to change proposed agency action. If
the proposed agency action were based on a rule at odds with a
statute, the presiding ALJ would not need to invalidate the rule. The
ALJ would merely interpret the rule to conform to the statute in order
to preserve the validity of the rule. This administrative approach is
analogous to the judicial approach of a court which does not interpret
a statute literally if a literal interpretation would render the statute
invalid under the relevant constitution. 7
Although a determination that a rule is invalid is not necessary in
a 120.57 proceeding, no legal impediment prohibits a recommended
order from invalidating an adopted rule which goes beyond the
statute implemented. No statutory requirement, similar to that
applicable to a 120.56 proceeding, would require an agency to
publish a notice of the invalidity of the rule. The recommended order
95. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(7)(d), (e) (2007).
96. Compare State v. Jenkins, 469 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. 1985) (a valid existing
rule has the force and effect of law), and Collier County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Fish
and Wildlife Conservation Comm'n., Nos. 2D07-1744, 2D07-11777, 2D-1796,
2008 WL 4180264 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2008) and Clemons, 870 So. 2d at
884 (Benton, J., concurring) (both cases holding that a rule is presumptively valid
until challenged in a 120.56 proceeding) with Askew, 372 So. 2d at 918-25, and
Save the Manatee Club, 773 So. 2d at 598 (rule is valid only if adopted under
proper delegation of legislative authority).
97. Unlike the statutory remedy in a 120.57 proceeding, a substantially
affected party initiates a 120.56 proceeding for the sole remedy of obtaining a
determination that the challenged rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority.
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would be subject to modification in the final order of the agency; 98
would be limited to the parties and facts of record; and would not
preclude the agency from relying on the rule in other cases, except to
the extent the doctrine of stare decisis may preclude reliance on the
rule in cases involving similar facts and law. 99
The APA literally requires a 120.57 proceeding whenever a
challenge to a rule involves a disputed issue of material fact.'00 If the
remedies afforded in a 120.57 proceeding are adequate for the ends
sought by the substantially affected party, the APA does not require a
duplicative 120.56 proceeding."'0 However, a substantially affected
party "may" file a 120.56 proceeding if the party seeks the additional
remedies available in that statute. 102
The separation of powers doctrine is self-executing and does not
require legislative enactment of Section 120.56 to prohibit the
enforcement in a 120.57 proceeding of a rule that arrogates
legislative power. Federal courts have expressly stated that the
separation of powers doctrine is self-executing. 103 No Florida
decisions were found that use the term "self-executing" to describe
the separation of powers doctrine, but courts have held: "the
legislature cannot, short of constitutional amendment, reallocate the
balance of power expressly delineated in the constitution among the
three coequal branches." 104
Constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing, 105
and the judicial test for a specific provision is whether the provision
98. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)0) (2007).
99. An agency is bound by administrative stare decisis to follow its final order
in like cases involving similar facts. Gessler v. Dep't. of Bus. and Prof'l.
Regulation, 627 So. 2d 501, 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
100. FLA. STAT. § 120.569(1)(2007)("s.120.57(l) applies whenever the
proceeding involves a disputed issue of material fact").
101. See FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (2007).
102. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1) (2007)("Any person substantially affected by a
rule... may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule ......
(emphasis added).
103. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-94 (1988); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1,121 (1976).
104. Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 268-69.
105. NAACP v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 876 So. 2d 636, 639 (Fla. 2004).
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requires legislative enactment to activate the provision.' °6  The
separation of powers doctrine does not require legislative enactment
of the APA in order to activate restrictions that the doctrine imposes
on the administrative state.
If the separation of powers doctrine were not self-executing, the
legislature could use the APA to "reallocate the balance of power"
among the "four" branches of government by requiring enforcement
of an invalid rule that arrogates legislative power unless the
substantially affected party complies with a legislative enactment in
Section 120.56. The result would apply unequally to numerous pro
se parties in 120.57 proceedings because pro se parties are
disproportionately poor, uneducated, disabled, and are ill-equipped to
comprehend an APA provision that would require them to comply
with a legislative enactment in Section 120.56 before they could
enjoy the protection of the separation of powers doctrine.
The APA is not a statutory prerequisite to the operation of the
separation of powers doctrine. The APA supplements separation of
powers protections and enhances the availability of the doctrine to
the people. 10 7 The fact that the separation of powers doctrine may be
supplemented by legislative enactment in the APA, further protecting
the doctrine or making it more available, does not of itself preclude a
determination that the doctrine is self-executing.' 0
8
The legislature has stated for many years that, "[flailure to
proceed under [Section 120.56] shall not constitute failure to exhaust
administrative remedies."' 1 9 One Florida court rejected the notion
that the APA requires a substantially affected party to file a
duplicative 120.56 proceeding before the party can challenge an
agency rule in a 120.57 proceeding:
An understanding of 120.57's centrality makes
clear that the [language] . . "Failure to proceed under
106. Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478, 486 (Fla. 2008);
Advisory Opinion of the Att'y Gen., Re Extending Existing Sales Tax to Non-
Taxed Servs., etc., 953 So. 2d 471, 484 (Fla. 2007); Smith v. Coal. to Reduce Class
Size, 827 So. 2d 959, 962 (Fla. 2002); St. John's Med. Plans, Inc. v. Gutman, 721
So. 2d 717, 719 (Fla. 1998); Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960).
107. See Gray, 125 So. 2d at 851.
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1) (2007).
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[Section 120.56] shall not constitute failure to exhaust
administrative remedies"- enhance[s] remedies
available under the [APA] . . . . The legislative
purpose is simply to avoid any appearance of
requiring a substantially affected party to initiate [a]
duplicative [120 .56] proceeding . . . if his rule
challenge is regularly presented with other grievances
under 120.57 110
Although the court relied on direct review in Article V, Section
4(b)(2) of the Florida Constitution, the ruling that appellate courts
may review a rule challenge in a 120.57 proceeding without a
duplicative 120.56 proceeding is consistent with the separation of
powers doctrine.
C. The Road to the Invalid Rule Not Challenged111
The last second-stage problem involves disputed agency action
based on a rule that goes beyond the statute implemented, but the
substantially affected party in a 120.57 proceeding does not challenge
the invalid rule in that proceeding and does not file a separate 120.56
proceeding. The first issue is whether an appellate court will review
a rule challenge not asserted in the administrative hearing, and the
second issue is whether the presiding ALJ in the 120.57 proceeding
must give effect to an unchallenged rule that goes beyond the statute
implemented.
Appellate courts generally do not consider an issue on appeal that
was not raised in the administrative hearing, 112 but they do review
unchallenged rules at odds with a statute. The decisions expressly
rely on the power of direct review in Article V, Section 4(b)(2) of the
110. State ex rel. Dep't. of Gen. Servs. v. Willis, 344 So. 2d 580, 592 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (emphasis added).
111. "Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, And sorry I could not travel both
." ROBERT FROST, Road Not Taken (1916), reprinted in COMPLETE POEMS OF
ROBERT FROST 131 (Henry Holt and Co. 1949).
112. See Werner v. Dep't. of Ins. and Treasurer, 689 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to hear objection to sufficiency of administrative
complaint for the first time on appeal).
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Florida Constitution, but the opinions echo both separation of power
and APA protections.
We reject the [agency's] contention that a court
must give an administrative rule effect, unless it has
been invalidated in proceedings under section 120.56,
even if the rule is unmistakably at odds with clear
statutory language. Executive branch rulemaking is
authorized in furtherance of, not in opposition to,
legislative policy. Just as a court cannot give effect to
a statute (or administrative rule) in any manner
repugnant to a constitutional provision, so a duly
promulgated administrative rule, although
"presumptively valid until invalidated in a section
120.56 rule challenge," must give way in judicial
proceedings to any contradictory statute that
applies. 113
A subsequent decision observed that an ALJ in a 120.57
proceeding "will deem controlling" a rule not challenged in the
administrative hearing. 1
14
While an [ALJ] presiding in a section 120.57
proceeding will deem controlling duly promulgated
administrative rules never challenged under section
120.56, it is open to a reviewing court to adjudicate an
administrative rule at odds with the statute it purports
to implement, even when there has been no
administrative rule challenge proceeding below. See
State ex rel. Dep't of Gen. Servs. v. Willis, 344 So. 2d
113. Willette v. Air Prods., 700 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(citation omitted). See also, One Beacon Ins. v. Agency for Health Care Admin.,
958 So. 2d 1127, 1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Zimmerman v. Fla. Windstorm
Underwriting Ass'n., 873 So. 2d 411, 415 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Broward
Children's Ctr., Inc. v. Hall, 859 So. 2d 623, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003);
Greenburg v. Cardiology Surgical Ass'n. & Claims Ctr. - Lakeland, 855 So. 2d
234, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Dep't. of Children & Family Servs. v. L.G.,
801 So. 2d 1047, 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
114. Clemons, 870 So. 2d at 884 (Benton, J., concurring).
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580, 592 (Fla. [Dist. Ct. App.] 1977) ("[P]rovisions
[now codified at section 120.56(1)(e)] are addressed
... to district courts of appeal, which might otherwise
rebuff rule challenges by petitions to review 120.57
proceedings because petitioner did not 'exhaust' the
rule-challenge remedies of 120.54 and .56.") .... 115
The decisions in Willette and Clemons raise the issue of whether
there is a judicial requirement for an AU to deem controlling an
unchallenged rule that arrogates legislative power by going beyond
the statute the rule purports to implement. A requirement to deem
controlling a rule at odds with a statute would necessarily require the
presiding ALJ to refuse to apply a statute at odds with the rule. An
ALJ is an officer of the executive branch of government. 1 6 The
Florida Supreme Court held in a case involving a property appraiser
that an officer of the executive branch cannot refuse to administer
statutes not yet judicially declared to be invalid." 7 The requirement
for officers of the executive branch to abide by statutes is "rooted in
the doctrine of separation of powers."" 8 As the Florida Supreme
Court explained:
[A]llowing executive officers to refuse to administer
statutes ... would result in "chaos and confusion" and
that the "people of this state have the right to expect
that each and every . . . state agency will promptly
carry out and put into effect the will of the people ...
expressed in the legislative acts of their duly elected
representatives."
115. Id.
116. DOAH is not a court created in Article V of the Florida Constitution (an
Article V court), and an AU is not a so-called Article V judge. DOAH is an
administrative agency organized with the executive branch of government.
117. Crossings at Fleming Island Cmty. Dev. Dist. v. Echeverri, No. SC07-
1556, 2008 Fla. Lexis 1222, at *16 (Fla. July 3, 2008).
118. Id. at *20.
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[N]o common law or statutory developments.., have
altered the basic principle, rooted in the doctrine of
separation of powers, that [executive officers] must
abide by. . . statutes . .119
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL AND APA SYMMETRY
The term "will," as it is used in the Clemons decision, does not
necessarily mean "must." The term "will" also means likelihood,
willingness, intention, probability, expectation, and customary or
habitual action.' 20 The beauty of the many definitions of "will" is in
the eye of the beholder. However, any definition which enforces a
rule that goes beyond the statute implemented is not beautiful in the
eye of the separation of powers doctrine.
A valid, existing rule has the force and effect of law, 121 but the
terms "valid" and "existing" are not synonymous. The emphasis in
the separation of powers doctrine is on a valid rule rather than an
existing rule. A valid rule does not go beyond the statute
implemented. 122
Rulemaking disposes of proof and debate of agency policy in a
120.57 proceeding. 123 However, proof and debate of agency policy
is not synonymous with the separation of powers doctrine.
Rulemaking may dispose of proof and debate of agency policy, but
statutory rulemaking requirements are powerless to dispose of
separation of powers protections. 124
The principal goal of statutory rulemaking requirements is
transparency rather than the enforceability of invalid rules. 125 The
requirement for rules to be adopted and promulgated in accordance
with statutory requirements and the requirement for final orders in
individual cases to be catalogued in a public, subject-matter index,
119. Id. at *16, *20.
120. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1968 (4th
ed. 2000).
121. Jenkins, 469 So. 2d at 734.
122. Askew, 372 So. 2d at 918-25; Save the Manatee Club., 773 So. 2d at 598.
123. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 583 (rulemaking requirements dispose of proof
and debate of agency policy in a 120.57 proceeding).
124. Id. at 580 n.6.
125. See FLA. STAT. § 120.536 (2007).
446 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 28-2
both serve the purpose of transparency by closing the gap between
what the agency staff knows about the agency's law and policy and
what a regulated party can know. 126 Nowhere in the APA does the
legislature say that rulemaking requirements are intended as a
mechanism for mandatory enforcement of an adopted rule which
arrogates legislative power by going beyond the statute implemented.
A judicial requirement for an ALJ to deem controlling rules or
non-rule policies that are at odds with a statute would deprive the
administrative state of the ability to resolve an intra-branch dispute
without arrogating legislative power and without the need for inter-
branch judicial review. A requirement to deem controlling agency
policy at odds with a statute would require the presiding ALJ to
arrogate legislative power when acting pursuant to a mechanism that
is legislatively intended to check agency arrogation of legislative
power.
A 120.57 proceeding is not bound by judicial principles of
appellate review that arguably would deprive an AU of authority to
review second-stage separation of powers problems not raised by the
parties. 127 A 120.57 proceeding is not a type of appellate trial 128 that
reviews previously taken agency action. A 120.57 proceeding is a de
novo proceeding that is intended to formulate final agency action.129
"The [ALJ's] decision to permit evidence of circumstances as they
existed at the time of hearing was correct. . . . Section 120.57
proceedings are intended to formulate final agency action, not to
review action taken earlier and preliminarily."130  An AU must
independently determine whether his or her order complies with
126. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 580. See also Straughn v. O'Riordan, 338 So.
2d 832, 834 n.3 (Fla. 1976) (A principal goal of the APA is the abolition of
'unwritten rules' by which agency employees can act with unrestrained discretion to
adopt, change, and enforce legislative policy).
127. See FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(1) (2007).
128. AU John G. Van Laningham coined the reference to an "oxymoronic
appellate trial" when discussing the distinction between the de novo review
authorized in FLA. STAT. § 120.57(3) for so-called bid protests and the de novo
hearing conducted in a 120.57 proceeding. Syslogic Techn. Servs., Inc. v. S. Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 01-4385BID, slip op. at 19 (Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings
January 18, 2002), available at http:www.doah.state.fl.us/ros/2001/01004385.PDF.
129. FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(e)(1) (2007).
130. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 584; Young v. Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs, 625 So.
2d 831, 833 (Fla. 1993).
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standards and guidelines prescribed in the terms of the enabling
statute.
VII. THE HARMONY OF INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY' 3 1
Second-stage problems pertaining to unchallenged rules and
unchallenged non-rule policy bring into play judicial independence
and impartiality, but the interplay of the two principles is harmonious
rather than discordant. Independence is rooted in structural aspects
of government that insulate the decisional process from the electorate
and other branches of government, including the appointment
process, protection of tenure and salary, and limits on the ability of
other branches of government to change an ALJ's decision. 132
Impartiality is more about neutrality and personal attributes, but
structural aspects such as statutory bans on ex parte communications
encourage impartiality. 133
An ALJ is the functional equivalent of a judge in the judicial
branch of government. 134 "There can be little doubt that the role of
the modem... administrative law judge is 'functionally comparable'
to that of a judge."'135  The quasi-judicial duties required to issue
recommended and final orders do not preclude either type of order
from being agency action, and agency action by any name must
comply with the separation of powers doctrine. In that sense, the
statute implemented in an ALJ's recommended or final order defines
his or her jurisdictional limits. Judicial impartiality does not preclude
an ALJ, or an Article V Judge, from a sua sponte determination of
whether he or she has jurisdiction to undertake agency action that
goes beyond the statute implemented. 136
131. "Such harmony is in immortal souls." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE
MERCHANT OF VENICE, Act 5, sc. 1.
132. See James E. Molitemo, The Administrative Judiciary's Independence
Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1191, 1200-01 (2006), reprinted in 27 J. NAALJ
53 (2007).
133. Id. See Dore II, supra note 60, at 1016-17; FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)0)
(2007) (limiting the grounds upon which an agency may alter an ALJ's findings of
fact and conclusions of law).
134. Moliterno, supra note 132, at 1209.
135. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
136. See Consol-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 72.
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The separation of powers doctrine is self-executing because the
doctrine operates without the need for legislative enactment. 137 It
would distort impartiality to argue that separation of powers
protections are not self-executing and do not protect a substantially
affected party from an invalid rule or non-rule policy unless the
substantially affected party asks for protection.
The requirement for an ALJ to independently harrow a sibling
agency's rule and non-rule policies does not offend judicial
impartiality. An ALJ does not favor the party of record who benefits
from the harrowing experience. The ALJ favors the public interest
served by RAP.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Variations between administrative states make it difficult to
generalize about the role of an ALJ in a particular state. The
separation of powers doctrine in a particular administrative state may
require an ALJ to independently actuate the doctrine by ensuring that
the ALJ's recommended and final orders do not constitute agency
action that goes beyond the terms of the enabling statute. Agency
policy, in the form of either a rule or non-rule policy, which is at
odds with a statute may have to give way to the statute to preserve
the validity of the policy. Second stage agency action cannot exceed
the first-stage powers delegated in the enabling statute without
violating the separation of powers doctrine. An ALJ, who issues
recommended or final agency action in a manner that is consistent
with the enabling statute, will find comfort in knowing, "All's well
that ends well." 138
137. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693.
138. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL, Act 4, sc. 5.
